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 If one were to interview a survivor of the Second World 
War British home front, they would almost certainly mention 
the Utility clothing scheme. Along with well-known propaganda 
campaigns like “Make Do and Mend” and “Mrs. Sew and Sew,” 
the Utility scheme is one of the most prominent and enduring 
features of the collective memory of the British home front 
experience.1 An unprecedented program  of economic regulation, 
Utility was a system of price and quality controls imposed by 
the Board of Trade - a legislative body that governed British 
commerce - on every stage of production in the clothing industry, 
from the price and type of cloth produced by textile mills to the 
price of a finished garment on the sales floor. The foremost intent 
of the program was to keep prices down and quality consistent 
to ensure that middle- and working-class wartime British citizens 
could afford good quality clothing. Every garment produced 
through the scheme bore a distinct label: twin CC’s paired with 
the number 41, nicknamed “the double cheeses.”2 This label 
became one of the most prominent trademarks of the British 
home front.
 Despite its memorability, the Utility scheme has received 
surprisingly little historiographical discussion.  Most of the 
scholarship that does exist focuses primarily on the scheme’s 
economic significance, rather than its importance to British 
fashion history.3 The writers who do analyze the Utility scheme 
from a fashion history perspective tend to do so as part of a broad 
overview of wartime fashion, rather than specifically focusing on 
the Utility scheme. Because of their breadth, these analyses often 
make slight mistakes, such as confusing the Utility scheme with 
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other wartime regulations like the austerity restrictions.4 While it 
is widely acknowledged by fashion historians that utility clothing 
failed to make a favorable impression on the consumer market, 
there has been little analysis as to why this was the case.
 The Utility scheme (and its siblings: clothes rationing 
and austerity restrictions) was not only an unprecedented system 
of economic regulation in the clothing industry, it was also an 
exceptional story of government interference in the development 
of British fashion. For the sake of this essay, the term “fashion” 
refers to a progression of popular trends in clothing and dress 
designs dictated by a conversation between those who produce 
them (designers, clothing manufacturers), those who present 
them (retailers, the fashion press), and those who wear them 
(the consumers, in this case women). This process is cyclical and 
interdependent. At any given point, a participant can be either 
a recipient or a respondent in the conversation on fashion. This 
conversation and Utility’s place in it were only partly about the 
trends themselves. The larger dialogue was more about how 
trends were produced and presented to the clothing industry, to 
the fashion press, or to women, and in turn each group’s response 
to that production and presentation.
 Although the primary purpose of the Utility scheme was 
economic – to ensure that all British citizens could afford good 
quality clothing in wartime – the Board of Trade also cared about 
Utility clothings’ fashionableness. Throughout the program’s 
history, Utility clothing was in competition with non-Utility 
attire. Even at its height, the Utility scheme comprised only 
80-85% of the total clothing market, leaving 15% of choice for 
the women who could afford it (mainly the middle- and upper-
classes).5 The Board of Trade wanted these women to choose 
Utility over non-Utility, and to accomplish that, it needed to 
make Utility desirable and fashionable – which, unfortunately, it 
was only marginally successful at best. The Board of Trade’s poor 
initial presentation of the project - as well as the word “Utility” 
itself - sparked a negative reaction in the clothing industry and 
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the public, prompting the Board to commission British haute 
couture designers to create Utility designs and improve the 
production and presentation of the scheme. Even this attempt 
on the government’s part had its problems, however, as neither 
the couturiers’ high profiles nor their designs for the scheme 
managed to impress the clothing industry and its consumers. As 
a result, Utility clothing fell short of making a lasting impression 
in fashion history. If anything, Utility clothing proved to have 
the opposite effect of normal fashion trends: an anti-statement. 
To the participants of the cyclical fashion conversation, the Board 
of Trade’s “conscripted fashion” proved to be no fashion at all.
Part I: Origins of the Utility Scheme
 From the onset of the Second World War, the British 
government predicted the conflict  would be massively disruptive 
to the home front economy. Most government officials in 1939 
remembered how taxing the First World War had been on the 
nation’s resources, specifically raw materials and labor. More so 
than any previous war, the First World War had been a contest 
of economic endurance, with the victor decided in part by which 
side could outlast the other. The British government, however, 
did not implement rationing until 1917, when the German naval 
blockade had caused near-crisis levels of shortage.6 To compensate 
for the abruptly restricted levels in production and consumption 
caused by rationing, the market drove prices sharply upwards. 
By 1918, the cost of living index in Britain had skyrocketed to 
over 265% of the prewar level.7 This figure continued to climb, 
reaching 330% by 1920.8 Food and clothing rationing during 
the First World War was reactive, an emergency response to 
unforeseen levels of shortage. As a result, it was not as successful 
as it could have been and led to much economic hardship in the 
postwar years.
 It was this economic hardship, as well as its potential 
effects on home front morale, that government officials sought 
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to avoid in 1939. The British government’s approach to the 
home front economy in the Second World War differed from 
that of the First World War in two key ways: first, rationing was 
preemptive, not reactive; and second, it was part of a package 
deal that included extensive price control and other forms of 
centralized economy management, such as setting production 
quotas at different stages of the clothes-making process. 
Throughout the Second World War, the government imposed 
three distinct forms of control over the clothing industry: clothes 
rationing, austerity restrictions, and the Utility scheme. Whereas 
clothes rationing restricted consumers’ purchase of clothing, 
Utility controlled prices and the quality of fabric, and austerity 
restricted the design, style, and make of the clothes themselves.
 The first step in the British government’s wartime control 
over the clothing industry began almost immediately in 1939 
with the passing of the Price of Goods Act. This act gave 
legislative bodies such as the Board of Trade the power to fix 
maximum prices on almost any item, including clothes, and in 
doing so, laid the foundation for what would eventually become 
the extensive system of price and quality control that was the 
Utility scheme.
 Despite their ability to fix maximum prices, the Board 
of Trade struggled initially to impose clothes rationing due to 
parliamentary resistance. In the meantime, it considered other 
means of restricting the clothing industry, including one idea 
that was a relic of the First World War - the ‘standard’ clothing 
scheme.9 Implemented in 1917, this scheme involved designating 
certain types and amounts of cloth produced by textile mills 
for the production of price-controlled, ‘standard’ suits for men 
and boys and ‘standard’ dresses for women and girls.10 The 
project had been poorly implemented and was only marginally 
successful, however, not to mention vastly unpopular among 
the public, who mistakenly viewed the ‘standard’ garments as 
a form of government-imposed uniforms.11 Furthermore, the 
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scheme’s controlled prices neither allowed room for sufficient 
profit nor provided alternative compensation or incentive for 
manufacturers to participate. Understandably, few did.12 As a 
result, very few ‘standard’ suits and dresses appeared in clothing 
stores, and consumers often turned down those that did appear 
in favor of better quality, ‘non-standard’ garments. The failure 
of this scheme, along with the unfortunate terms ‘standard’ and 
‘standardization,’ left a difficult legacy for the Board of Trade to 
work with as it considered its options in the Second World War.
 Regardless of these challenges, the press did not wait for 
the Board of Trade to reach a decision. In early 1940, as soon 
as news of a potential revival of the First World War’s ‘standard’ 
scheme reached the media, rumors began to circulate. Before 
any official announcement had been made, papers like the Daily 
Express reported that “standard suits” may soon be reintroduced. 
In April, when a reporter asked Edward Leslie Burgin, Britain’s 
Minister of Supply, if the government was considering standard 
suits, the minister failed to provide a definitive answer one way 
or the other.13 With no solid information to report, the press 
continued to speculate. In September 1940, the Daily Mirror and 
Daily Mail advanced speculation about the predicted standard 
clothing, even listing specific prices and patterns, still before the 
Board of Trade had made any official statement.14 This confusing 
sensationalism, based primarily on the ghost of the ‘standard’ 
clothing scheme and the evasive comments of government 
officials, laid the groundwork for the misrepresentation and 
misinterpretation of all subsequent government clothing 
regulations.
 Notwithstanding its inability to keep ‘standard’ 
discussions secret, the Board of Trade somehow managed to 
successfully conceal its plans for clothes rationing from the 
press. In 1941, the announcement of the decision to ration 
clothes came as a complete surprise both to the press and to 
the public as E.M.H. Humphreys, a Civil Services worker in 
Cardiff, commented in her diary entry on that date.15 Due to the 
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staunch opposition clothes rationing faced in Parliament from 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the Conservatives who 
were concerned about over-regulating the wartime economy, 
Oliver Lyttelton, President of the Board of Trade, had resorted 
to extreme measures to get it passed, namely keeping his plans 
entirely confidential and biding his time for the right opportunity. 
That opportunity arrived in early 1941, when Churchill became 
obsessively preoccupied with the hunt for the German submarine 
Bismarck. While the hunt diverted the Prime Minister’s attention, 
Lyttelton finally managed to “slip” clothes rationing through 
Parliament, announcing his feat suddenly on June 1. Lyttelton 
even scheduled the announcement strategically. June 1 was a 
bank holiday, therefore all the shops were closed. This gave the 
clothing industry and the public a day to get used to the idea of 
rationing before it officially began. The launch of clothes rationing 
occurred so suddenly, however, that shoppers initially had to use 
margarine coupons in place of those designated specifically for 
clothes because the clothing coupon booklets had not yet been 
printed. Eventually, each citizen received sixty-six annual ration 
coupons (a figure that fluctuated dramatically throughout the 
war), along with a booklet explaining the uses and restrictions 
of those coupons.16 Regardless of the initial surprise, the public 
proved reasonably receptive to the idea of rationing.17 Lyttelton’s 
well-executed plan proved the Board of Trade could manage 
its public relations successfully. This success, however, would 
unfortunately not repeat itself in the context of the subsequent 
Utility scheme and austerity restrictions.
 The early success of its publicity notwithstanding, 
clothes rationing quickly proved to be economically insufficient 
without effective price control. Despite the powers granted by 
the 1939 Price of Goods Act, the Board of Trade was reluctant 
to implement extensive price control in the clothing industry 
because of its complexity. As contemporary historian H.E. 
Wadsworth remarked, “It was one thing to fix the price of bread 
or coal or candles. It was another altogether to regulate fashion 
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goods of all shapes, sizes and qualities.”18 Regardless, price 
control seemed necessary. As ration coupons restricted the 
amount of clothing people could buy in a year, those who 
could afford it chose to spend their money and coupons on 
more durable – and often more expensive – garments, driving 
prices higher. In April 1941, the price of clothing averaged 
72% above the prewar level. By the following year, it rose to 
95%.19 The cost of living index also continued to climb as 
a direct result of the rampant rise in clothing prices. While 
certain socio-economic classes were able to keep up with 
these increases, spending their money and coupons on the 
best quality goods they could, lower classes were often forced 
to waste precious coupons on shoddy clothing that fell apart 
before the next rationing cycle.20 The Board of Trade decided 
action above and beyond rationing needed to be taken to keep 
prices down and sufficiently clothe all sectors of British society. 
If not, they risked suffering a crisis like that of the years after 
the First World War and even worse, a crisis in home front 
morale – and therein, the war effort. It was beginning to look 
as if some kind of “standard” program would be necessary after 
all. 
 By the summer of 1941, the Board of Trade launched 
into designing and implementing such a project, one that would 
regulate quality and price at every stage of production in the 
clothing industry for virtually all types of clothing, not just suits 
and dresses.21 Due to the program’s complexity and the Board 
of Trade’s desire to avoid the mistakes of the First World War, 
however, preparation took much longer than expected.  Despite 
the Board’s hope of distancing itself from the ‘standard’ scheme 
of the First World War, during the early stages of the planning 
process it often took to calling the new scheme “standard” 
as well.22 For the first step of the complex process, the Board 
calculated a national clothing budget in which it estimated the 
number of “standard” and “non-standard” garments likely to be 
bought each year. As the program was intended first and foremost 
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to assist those who were struggling the most to buy good quality 
clothes under the rationing system, officials designed it to meet 
100% of the clothing needs of families with an annual income 
of fewer than 200 pounds, and 25% of the adults and 50% of 
the children in households with annual incomes between 200 to 
300 pounds – in other words, the middle- and working-classes 
of wartime Britain.23 At its height, the project accounted for 80-
85% of the total British clothing market, but never 100%, as not 
all raw materials were suitable for the scheme’s specifications and 
not all manufacturers had machinery or labor suitable for the 
long production runs it required.24
  Once the Board knew roughly how much clothing it 
needed to produce through the program each year, it drew up 
quality specifications for the types and varieties of cloth designated 
to make that clothing, such as thread count and shrinkage. The 
process of cloth specification alone was a herculean task, as any 
one textile manufacturer produced thousands of varieties of 
cotton alone.25 To accomplish such an undertaking, the Board of 
Trade worked with the British Standards Institute (BSI), which 
in turn dedicated separate sub-committees for each primary type 
of cloth - cotton, rayon, and wool. After lengthy discussion with 
representatives from the textile industry itself, the BSI came 
up with 40 essential types of cloth: 16 varieties of cotton, 19 
of wool, 4 of rayon, and 1 of locknit.26 It then assigned each 
type of cloth a number and a list of quality specifications. For 
example, every yard of 404 cotton would be required to have X 
shrinkage and Y number of threads. As the project evolved, it 
encompassed a greater range of cloth, but the initial production 
runs were limited to just these 40. In time, this limitation would 
prove problematic. 
 Once the BSI had completed the cloth specifications, the 
Board of Trade needed to provide incentive for manufacturers to 
produce that cloth – the very incentive that had been lacking in 
the 1917 ‘standard’ scheme. The Board came up with a system 
of designation. Textile mills could apply to become designated 
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“standard” cloth producers, and in return, they would be guaranteed 
access to raw materials, which were becoming increasingly limited 
due to the German naval blockade that restricted shipments of 
raw cotton and wool from British dominions such as India and 
New Zealand.27 Even with this incentive, manufacturers were 
understandably reluctant to participate in a scheme that limited 
their profit margins, but enough were grudgingly brought on 
board to produce a considerable number of “standard” clothing 
in the production runs of late 1941.28
 The final step in the Board of Trade’s preparations 
was the most daunting and controversial task of all: drawing 
up a list of maximum prices for each type of garment at each 
subsequent production stage. Not only did the Board of Trade fix 
maximum prices for the cloth and the garment on the sales floor, 
but every stage in between, from the sale price of the clothing 
manufacturer to the wholesaler to the retailer. As the BSI had 
done when assembling the list of designated cloths, the Board of 
Trade made efforts to work with representatives from each sector 
of the clothing industry when drawing up its prices.29 Involving 
the industry itself did not guarantee perfection, however, and 
there were frequent disputes between Board of Trade officials and 
the representatives of the clothing industry.30
 On balance, the Board of Trade was very thorough when 
designing its wartime clothing program, gathering input directly 
from the experts in the field and leaving practically nothing 
to chance. For all their thoroughness, though, it neglected to 
consider one of the project’s simplest yet most crucial details: its 
name. The Board put little, if any, deliberate thought into what 
to call the program, even while designing it. At the very least, the 
Board knew it could not keep calling its project the “standard” 
clothing scheme, in part because the name had been used already 
and in part because of its previous connotations of standardization 
and uniformity. As Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade 
Captain Charles Waterhouse posited, the civilian population 
was “not going to be dragooned into wearing some sort of State 
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uniform.”31 Notwithstanding the Board’s wise decision to nix the 
word “standard,” officials did not invest any strategic thought 
in a better alternative.32 The first recorded use of the word 
“Utility” appeared no sooner than the announcement speech of 
the program itself, on July 12, 1941. Metford Watkins, Director 
General of Civilian Clothing, the subdivision of the Board of 
Trade directly in charge of running the scheme, employed the 
term arbitrarily, using the phrase “general utility” to describe 
everyday garments economically in reach of the working-class, 
which comprised the scheme’s primary market.33 To distance the 
project from standardization, Watkins even suggested (perhaps 
jokingly) that the menswear of the scheme should be nicknamed 
a “Watkins Suit.”34 Evidently, that phrase did not last as long 
as Utility, but it illustrates a half-hearted attempt and ultimate 
failure to establish a more appealing name.
 Why was “Utility” such an inadequate label? First, it had 
been used in the clothing industry before to describe a type of 
heavy-duty garment designed to weather tough use, the equivalent 
of what consumers today might think of as blue-collar “work 
clothes.” It appeared with relative frequency in advertisements 
for coats and jackets well before the Utility scheme’s conception, 
proving that consumers already had a preexisting idea in mind 
when they heard the word “Utility,” an idea contrary to the 
reality of Utility scheme clothes.35 While the world “Utility” 
made consumers picture drab, unflattering jumpsuits, in actuality 
Utility garments differed little in appearance from non-Utility 
attire. Second, like the word “standard,” “Utility” conveyed a 
degree of standardization to British consumers, or at the very least 
failed to erase the fears that had cropped up while rumors of the 
return of the 1917 ‘standard’ scheme still circulated. Consumers 
were afraid the government would force them all into wearing 
uniforms for the duration of the war.
 Regardless, the Board of Trade stuck with its choice 
of label. References to the “Utility” scheme began appearing 
in clothing advertisements and window displays shortly after 
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production of the clothes began in late 1941.36 Later on, in April 1942, 
the Board passed legislation that made it illegal for advertisements to 
use the word to refer to anything other than garments officially part 
of the program, thus sealing the fate of Utility as the official name 
of the scheme.37 Along with this designation, the Board of Trade 
required manufacturers to attach the official Utility label to every 
garment produced from Utility designated cloth, making the “CC41” 
or “double cheeses” mark one of the most recognizable and memorable 
logos of the British home front.38 The Board of Trade hoped that this 
emblem would become an indicator of good quality for a fair price, 
but unfortunately that was not always the case, especially in the early 
months of the project.
Part II: Negative Initial Reactions to Utility 
 Despite the Board of Trade’s meticulous efforts to promote its 
new program, the first Utility clothing that appeared in stores in January 
1942 received mixed to negative reactions on all sides, from the public 
to the press to the clothing industry itself.39 Much of this negativity, 
particularly in the public sphere, did not stem from issues with the 
clothes themselves but rather related to the negative connotations of the 
word “Utility,” as well as its predecessor, ‘standard.’40 Unfortunately, a 
small portion of the negativity was grounded in empirical evidence, as 
some of the first Utility clothing in stores was rather shoddy. This only 
confirmed the suspicions of the public, press, and industry, further 
extrapolating the Board of Trade’s publicity issues. Since it was still 
early in the scheme’s development, however, all hope was not yet lost, 
and if the Board solved the quality issues and took the right steps in 
publicity, it had a chance at turning around initial negative reception.
 The first verdict came in February 1942, when the Drapers’ 
Record, a prominent journal for clothiers and other sectors of the 
clothing industry, released one of the earliest articles surveying women’s 
initial receptions of the Utility scheme. The article began by pointing 
out that since Utility had yet to make a significant appearance in stores, 
many of the women interviewed based their opinions solely on their 
impressions of the word “Utility,” rather than on firsthand experience. 
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One interviewee commented that “Utility” made her think of a 
uniform -  “government stuff, sackcloth.”41 Another interviewee 
worried Utility clothing would be “clumsy and heavy.”42 Still 
another expected colors to be “dark and uninteresting.”43 The 
reporter even added that these three women had not heard 
about the scheme before being interviewed about it, further 
demonstrating the power of the word “Utility” to produce 
negative first impressions of the entire project.44
 The following month, Mass Observation, a politically-
independent organization that collected data on British public 
opinion on a wide range of topics, released one of its first reports 
on the initial reaction of the British public to the Utility scheme. 
Interviewing respondents from a wide range of backgrounds 
- from window shoppers to haute couture designers - Mass 
Observation’s report concluded much the same as the Drapers’ 
Record article. As the report detailed, the previous use of the 
word “standard” had created “resistances to the scheme,” which 
the word “Utility” failed to amend, having “given an entirely 
misleading impression as to the real nature of these clothes.”45 
The report concluded that the public was reacting negatively to 
the name, and not necessarily to the clothes themselves, and that 
the Board of Trade had a chance at reversing public opinion with 
the right publicity.
 The fashion press chimed in on similar notes.  In an 
article titled “The Only Thing Wrong with These Clothes is their 
Name,” Ann Seymour, writing for the March edition of Woman 
and Beauty, confessed that when she first heard the word “Utility” 
she had “visions of sack-cloth at best,” and “wondered just how 
long it would be before we were all going about looking as if 
we’d been cut out from the same paper pattern,” but concluded 
that the Utility clothes she viewed at a fashion show were 
“smart, well cut,” and “beautifully made,” and that the public 
would agree once they were properly informed.46 An article in 
the April edition of Tailor and Cutter consented that the word 
“Utility” gave misleadingly negative first impressions: “There is 
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 no glamour about Utility in clothes and…certainly the word 
would not appeal to women.”47 It seemed, therefore, that if the 
Board of Trade wanted to mitigate the effects of its poorly chosen 
scheme name, it would have to try and inject a little “glamour” 
into Utility.
 Unfortunately for the Board of Trade, however, it was 
not always just the name or idea of the Utility scheme that 
led to negative initial reactions in the press and public. Some 
consumers had good reason to complain. The quality of certain 
elements of the first Utility clothes in stores was rather shabby. 
Even with months of preparation, the Board of Trade and the 
British Standards Institute had not had enough time to draw up 
sufficiently detailed specifications to ensure consistent quality 
in each of the forty designated Utility cloths, and they also 
failed to impose adequate accountability measures on clothing 
manufacturers.48 Even after the Board of Trade compensated them 
with guaranteed access to raw materials, skeptical manufacturers 
were frustrated by being forced to make something they did not 
want to make - long production runs of lower grade fabrics and 
clothes – and angered by the restrictions Utility imposed on their 
profits.49 As a consequence , they often gave the production of 
Utility cloth and clothing a low priority, sometimes even failing 
to provide sufficient care and attention to the garments’ cuts and 
trimmings. The resulting clothes were a disappointment, made 
from cloth of inconsistent quality, and lacked a polished finish. 
Although not all of the first Utility clothes turned out this way, 
those that did only compounded the scheme’s poor reception by 
the press and public, adding proof to their fears of drabness and 
shoddy quality.
 The final blow to the Utility scheme’s rocky start 
was the dogged reluctance of the clothing retailers, who, like 
manufacturers, were irked by the restrictions on their profit 
margins and doubtful of how well Utility would sell. When 
the first Utility garments arrived in shipments to clothing 
stores, many retailers immediately shoved them into storage or 
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backrooms, choosing to delay displaying them on sales floors until 
their old, non-Utility stocks had been depleted.50 These retailers 
cited the lack of public interest in Utility as their excuse, failing 
to understand that it was in their businesses’ best interests to 
help generate public enthusiasm for the project,  especially since 
Utility would soon become a large part of the market.51 Even the 
retailers that did choose to openly display Utility garments in 
the early stages of the program were not always willing or able to 
accurately explain the scheme to inquiring customers, prompting 
an article in the Drapers’ Record that coached retailers on how to 
amend this problem.52 The trick, according to the article, was to 
stress the value and quality of Utility clothing. Retailers were to 
explain that although the Board of Trade kept prices low, quality 
was still as high, or better than comparably-priced garments had 
Utility clothing displayed in shop window
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been before the scheme.53 “Remembering that in six months or 
so the greater part of your trade will be Utility,” another Drapers’ 
Record article chastised retailers, “what are you doing to make the 
public more ‘Utility-conscious?’”54
 While this might have been an opportune moment for 
the Board of Trade to step in and provide an official definition of 
the Utility scheme for retailers to use, the Board remained silent. 
When a journalist from the Drapers’ Record asked Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Board of Trade Captain Charles Waterhouse 
whether the government had taken steps to stop references to 
‘standard clothing’ and accurately define the Utility scheme, 
he replied that it “was a matter for the newspapers” to “teach 
the public what ‘Utility’ clothing means.”55 In fact, the British 
government as a whole – not just the Board of Trade – was 
hypocritical in its approach to providing its citizens, particularly 
women, with home front information. On the one hand, the 
government relied on and expected editors in the fashion and 
women’s press to present women with accurate information on 
war-related matters such as the Utility scheme.  On the other 
hand, the government refused to work directly with these editors 
or provide them with official information.56 It felt that women 
simply did not need or want to hear about “war stuff” when they 
were so busy tending to their homes and families.57 The Board of 
Trade applied similar logic to the Utility scheme and thus left it 
up to the fashion press to decide what and what not to say about 
the scheme, resulting in inconsistency and confusion over what 
exactly was meant by the term “Utility.” This further aggravated 
the negative initial response from women, since many of them 
were not made aware of how the Utility scheme operated, or of 
its purpose. All they saw was the “double cheeses” label in stores, 
occasionally attached to clothes of unimpressive quality.
 Although the Board of Trade refused to take full 
responsibility for accurately explaining the scheme to the 
public and dispelling misconceptions about the program, it did 
recognize that action needed to be taken to improve Utility’s 
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reputation. First, it approached the issue of quality by drawing 
up stricter and more elaborate specifications, expanding the list 
of designated cloth, and implementing quality control tests – a 
relatively simple fix.58 Second, it tackled the more complicated 
and widespread publicity issue. As mentioned, apart from a few 
initial cases, the problem was not the clothes themselves. Jean 
Guest, a reporter for the Drapers’ Record, wrote that Utility 
clothes and non-Utility clothes alike had “an equal share of 
fashion interest and style.”59 The foremost problem was public 
prejudice against the idea of the scheme, the word “Utility,” 
and all it conveyed. In order to convince women to spend 
precious coupons on Utility clothes instead of their non-Utility 
counterparts, the Board of Trade needed to overcome this bias 
and assure women that Utility clothes were of good value, good 
quality, and even fashionable. The Mass Observation file report 
from March recommended fashion shows, stylish photographs, 
and positive reviews in prominent fashion magazines to improve 
the project’s image. The Board, however, ended up going a step 
beyond these ideas.60 It decided to recruit a special group of 
individuals it thought might inspire the most excitement for the 
program: Britain’s most renowned couturiers, the Incorporated 
Society of London Fashion Designers.
Part III: Bringing in the Best: The IncSoc Utility Commission
The Board of Trade’s commissioning of the Incorporated Society 
of London Fashion Designers (IncSoc) marked a turning point 
in the history of the Utility scheme. It had the potential to turn 
public opinion around and even earn Utility a respected place in 
the progression of fashion history. The Society was comprised of 
the biggest, most influential names in British fashion at the time 
- designers who had earned the right to their fame through their 
talent and ingenuity - and the group was practically custom built 
for cooperation between the government and the fashion world. 
Furthermore, the IncSoc Utility commission received exuberate 
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coverage in the fashion press, from upper tier magazines like 
Vogue to popular housewife reads like Modern Woman. Thanks to 
this commission there was still hope for the public to see Utility 
as something other than a restriction – and just when the Board 
of Trade needed it most.
 On top of the negative initial impressions the Utility 
scheme was making in the press and public, there was another 
pressing issue that drove the Board of Trade to finally seek 
publicity solutions: the looming implementation of the third 
and final form of wartime regulation on the clothing industry, 
the austerity restrictions. Though Utility helped ensure a certain 
level of durability and quality in the cloth garments were made 
from, more could still be done to reduce the labor needed to 
Model wearing evening dress designed by IncSoc couturier 
Peter Russell
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produce these clothes.61 In early 1942, shortly after Utility first 
started arriving in stores, the Board of Trade decided to introduce 
restrictions on the style and make of clothing. These regulations – 
commonly referred to as austerity restrictions – applied to Utility 
and non-Utility clothes alike, and there were several different 
types.62 The first type prohibited the use of trimmings such as 
embroidery, applique work, or leather embellishments. The 
second limited the use of materials that were particularly scarce, 
such as steel or elastic. The third type of restriction governed 
the design of garments themselves: in women’s outerwear, 
the Board set limits for the number of pleats, seams, buttons, 
and buttonholes, as well as maximum widths of sleeves, belts, 
hems, and collars. The fourth and arguably most controversial 
austerity restriction placed a limit on the number of basic designs 
per type of garment. For example, each clothing manufacturer 
could produce no more than fifty different designs of dresses.63 
Restrictions allowed them to switch out these designs once a 
year, but for an industry that was accustomed to two or three 
annual seasons, this was a tremendous blow. It was a step beyond 
Utility, which had only governed the cloth and price of clothes, 
not the design process itself. In addition, unlike Utility, austerity 
restrictions applied to the entire clothing market, from working-
class pinafores to the Queen’s evening gowns.64
 The looming implementation of the austerity 
restrictions, on top of the public’s negative predisposition 
towards Utility, drove the Board of Trade to seek solutions and 
hire the Incorporated Society of London Fashion Designers. 
The group attracted the Board for several reasons, firstly because 
it included the biggest names in London’s haute couture – or 
high fashion – scene, names that had the power to influence 
public approval. Much like today, these designers created looks 
for the most famous celebrities in Britain, and some of them, 
such as the Queen’s official dressmaker, Norman Hartnell, were 
even celebrities themselves. Others included some of the most 
renowned designers in British fashion history. Edward Molyneux 
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(a British native, despite his French surname), was a celebrated 
contributor to the Paris collections until he emigrated back to 
London to escape the Nazi occupation in 1941.65 Digby Morton 
and Hardy Amies, on the other hand, were well known for their 
contributions to the classic British tailored suit.66 Other IncSoc 
designers included Elspeth Champcommunal, lead designer 
for Worth, one of London’s top couture houses, Victor Stiebel, 
Bianca Mosca, Charles Creed, and Peter Russell, all of whom 
were household names in the 1940s.67 The Board of Trade hoped 
that with these couturiers leading from the top, as well as the 
publicity and excitement their names would generate, they could 
inject a little glamour into the Utility scheme.
 Secondly, these designers were famous for a reason. 
They were talented and inventive – capable, the Board of Trade 
hoped, of rising to the unique, Project Runway-esque design 
challenges presented by the austerity restrictions. In fact, when 
Hardy Amies first heard of the impending style restrictions, he 
reportedly laughed and said that he and Molyneux had been 
designing austerity for years.68 In his autobiography he later 
wrote that he “hardly found these regulations irksome,” as he 
felt they attested to his strengths as a designer: simplicity and 
“sobriety.”69 On the other hand, some of the other designers, 
such as Norman Hartnell, were less than thrilled by the austerity 
restrictions, but still proved every bit as capable of taking on the 
challenge. One of Hartnell’s signature design features were his 
elaborate embellishments in beadwork and embroidery, which 
austerity restrictions prohibited. To overcome this obstacle, the 
designer took to hand painting his elegant patterns onto his 
gowns and dresses.70 The Board of Trade was confident these 
designers would be able to produce Utility garments that would 
be attractive and fashionable to the public, even with the added 
restrictions posed by austerity.
 The third and perhaps most convenient appeal of turning 
to IncSoc was the group had practically been created for the task. 
That is, the group had been founded in part to further the interests 
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of the British government and hence offered an ideal platform for 
cooperation between the fashion world and the Board of Trade. 
According to IncSoc’s official history, one of the group’s foremost 
purposes was to unite London’s top designers in promoting “the 
sales of British fashions in… overseas markets,” and in so doing, 
earn foreign currency to help finance the British war effort.71 
The first joint venture of the group had been a fashion show 
exported to South America, which had been enthusiastically 
covered by the British fashion press and well-received by its target 
market.72 In fact, the success of this show prompted the official 
formation of IncSoc itself, which had formerly existed under 
the more nebulous guise of an organization called the London 
Fashion Group.73 However, once the American Lend-Lease Act 
InSoc designer Norman Hartnell comparing a finished dress to its original 
sketch 
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began providing Britain with sufficient levels of munitions and 
funding in late 1941, IncSoc’s primary services were rendered 
unnecessary. In early 1942, shortly after the group cancelled their 
proposed New York show, the Board of Trade approached them 
about designing a set of garments for the Utility scheme that 
also tastefully demonstrated the impending austerity restrictions, 
which were scheduled to be announced in May.74 IncSoc officially 
accepted the Board of Trade’s commission in March.75 With their 
New York show cancelled, the group needed a collaborative 
project to justify its continued existence. They also felt it was a 
good opportunity for the designers to demonstrate doing their 
patriotic duty for their country: good for both public morale and 
for the designers’ own reputations. Lastly, IncSoc felt it might 
provide a chance to improve levels of “taste” in mass-produced 
fashion and its customers.76
 By late March 1942, the Board of Trade established a list 
of criteria for the IncSoc Utility commission. Each participating 
designer would produce three ensembles: an overcoat, a skirt 
suit, and a day dress. All garments would be made from Utility 
designated cloth and conform to austerity restrictions. As austerity 
only allowed clothing manufacturers one set of designs a year, 
the garments would be designed for all-year use, as opposed to a 
specific season. Lastly and most importantly, the garments would 
be designed intentionally for mass production – a realm most 
haute couture designers were previously unaccustomed to. Once 
completed, the garments’ patterns would be made available for 
clothing manufacturers to purchase and release into the ready-
made fashion market.77
 When the Board of Trade finally released the completed 
designs in September 1942, the collection received exuberate 
coverage by the fashion press.78 Eight IncSoc designers 
participated: Digby Morton, Hardy Amies, Victor Stiebel, Peter 
Russell, Charles Creed, Bianca Mosca, Edward Molyneux, and 
Elspeth Champcommunal. Norman Hartnell also participated 
in designing for the Utility scheme, but through the wholesale 
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company Berketex rather than directly for the Board of Trade.79 
The fashion press, as well as the clothing industry and the public, 
were introduced to the new IncSoc Utility collection through 
several fashion shows, including one which featured pairs of 
models wearing nearly identical garments – one Utility and one 
non-Utility – that asked the audience to guess which was which.80 
The success of these shows led to articles charged with positivity, 
particularly for the novel concept of haute couture designers 
creating clothes for the masses. In an article for their October 
1942 issue, Vogue praised the collection as “an object lesson in 
the power of pure style over mere elegance,” and “a revolutionary 
scheme…an outstanding example of applied democracy.”81 
Modern Woman echoed this view in their December issue, calling 
the IncSoc Utility collection “the greatest revolution that has 
ever taken place in the clothing industry of this country.”82 On 
balance, the fashion press was excited and impatient for the haute 
couture Utility designs to hit the mass market.
 As the first fashion ever commissioned by the government, 
the Board of Trade considered the designs historically significant 
and immediately sent the original models to the Victoria and 
Two models wearing a Utility day dress and skirt 
suit 
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Albert Museum for preservation.83 In fact, the Board of Trade 
was so proud of their historic commission that the pieces went on 
immediate public display. All the models remain at the Victoria 
and Albert Museum to this day, and some are even part of the 
Museum’s permanent fashion exhibit. All in all, the Board of 
Trade felt satisfied and even optimistic about the results of the 
IncSoc Utility commission.
Part IV: What Happened to Revolution?: The Weaknesses of 
the IncSoc Utility Commission
 Despite the Board of Trade’s hope in the “revolutionary” 
IncSoc Utility commission, the project did not result in 
remarkable success. Not all articles in the fashion press were as 
positive as those in Vogue and Modern Woman, and some were 
even downright negative. Clothing manufacturers once again 
proved skeptical, and the haute couture designers’ inexperience 
in designed for the mass market showed. Lastly public reaction – 
the whole point of it all – proved lukewarm, due to factors both 
within and beyond the Board of Trade’s control.
 As early as August 1942, before the Board of Trade had 
even released IncSoc’s final designs, the Drapers’ Record reported 
a disgruntled sentiment in the clothing industry towards the 
commission. One of the clothing manufacturers’ initial criticisms 
was that the IncSoc commission would not be sufficient to 
clothe the entire market. In an article entitled “Women Still 
Want Variety,” clothing manufacturers pointed out that despite 
the “consumer appeal” the IncSoc designs might have, their 
female customers would not all want to wear the same eight skirt 
suits, overcoats, and dresses.84 “Every dress maker and retailer 
knows that each Mrs. Smith wants clothes different from those 
worn by all the other Smiths and Browns…Similarity of style, 
mass produced, is unlikely to meet with favorable feminine 
reception.”85 The clothing industry’s second major issue with 
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the IncSoc designs was a sense of “resentment” that the IncSoc 
designers “were brought in to show a long-established industry its 
job.”86 Clothing manufacturers employed their own stylists who, 
unlike haute couture designers, specialized in creating clothing 
for mass production. They did not appreciate the message the 
Board of Trade seemed to be giving them by bringing in IncSoc: 
namely that the industry designers had not been doing a good 
enough job designing for the Utility scheme by themselves and 
needed guidance from the “top.”
 In early October, when the Board of Trade officially 
unveiled the finished IncSoc designs and made the patterns 
available for purchase by clothing manufacturers, some experts 
in the industry reacted with a sense of “disappointment…tinged 
with a certain amount of satisfaction.”87 According to them, the 
IncSoc designs were hardly saleable and remarkably unremarkable. 
In addition, manufacturers and retailers continued, the “designs 
may be all right for the [haute couture] trade; but will they suit 
medium-price business?”88 J.P. Grossman, director of Graceline 
Dress Co. Ltd., added that the patterns did not “fit in with the 
trade idea of popular-price dress-making” and did not “appear to 
be specially labour- or material-saving.”89 “I thought we might 
learn something from these,” he lamented, almost smugly.
 To a certain extent, the clothing industry had a right to 
be frustrated by IncSoc’s designs, as the haute couture designers 
that produced them were not accustomed to designing clothing 
for mass production. Before beginning work on their Utility 
models, the IncSoc designers had to visit clothing factories to 
acquaint themselves with how machine-made garments were 
produced.90 Even after their self-education, some of the designers’ 
garments still encountered problems in mass production and 
had to be redone, if not abandoned altogether.91 In an October 
meeting between IncSoc and the Board of Trade (shortly before 
the patterns became available to the manufacturers), Mr. W. 
Heron, a Board official, evaluated each of the designs’ initial 
performances in trial production runs. All the designers but 
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Edward Molyneux and Victor Stiebel had encountered problems 
and needed to rework their designs. In the case of the dresses, some 
did not even conform to rations-imposed maximum yardage.92 
Furthermore, whenever Mr. Heron made a negative comment on 
the results of a designer’s work, the designer was quick to blame 
the manufacturer, not flaws in their design, perhaps because they 
still felt their work was above that meant for mass production.
 Furthermore, though the public’s reaction to the IncSoc 
Utility commission was not as negative as that of the clothing 
industry, it was lukewarm at best. There were several reasons 
for this, the foremost being the delay between when the IncSoc 
designs were first announced to the public – fall 1942 – and 
when the designs finally hit the stores, which was not until 
spring 1943. The Board of Trade was unable to sell the patterns 
to manufacturers in time for the 1942 fall season, and hence had 
to wait another six months for the garments to arrive in stores.93 
Unlike the initial announcement of the IncSoc designs, their 
arrival in retail stores spring 1943 received no great fanfare in the 
Two seamstresses tacking together a day dress in the 
workroom of Norman Hartnell's fashion house 
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fashion press. Despite its enthusiasm in fall 1942, Vogue failed to 
mention the actual arrival of IncSoc Utility in stores. Ultimately, 
its primary focus as a magazine was to follow the happenings 
in haute couture, rather than mass produced fashion. In Vogue’s 
view, the IncSoc Utility commission had been an entertaining 
anomaly, but not one worth following up on. Unfortunately, it 
seems the rest of the fashion press agreed, and magazines across 
the genre failed to mention the arrival.
 In addition, as per the conditions of the Board of Trade’s 
original agreement with the Society, the IncSoc Utility clothes 
were not advertised or labeled as “haute couture” designs in 
stores.94 Though the Society had discussed the creation of an 
“IncSoc Utility” label in its meetings, they failed to settle on a 
finalized design, and the garments that eventually hit the stores 
did not have this label.95 In other words, if the average middle-
class housewife had not been keeping up on fashion news – which 
was very likely, considering how expensive magazines like Vogue 
and Harper’s Bazaar were during the war – she would have no 
idea that some of the new Utility models in stores spring 1943 
had been designed by IncSoc.96 To most consumers, the IncSoc 
Utility clothing looked much like any other Utility clothing, 
which continued to suffer from the negative connotations 
implied by the word “Utility”: drab, uninteresting, heavy, etc. At 
this point, women did begin buying Utility in greater numbers, 
but primarily out of necessity rather than desire. It also helped 
that Utility clothes were no longer subject to purchase tax.97
 The Board of Trade, the fashion press, and even IncSoc 
itself had hoped the IncSoc Utility clothing’s “superior design” 
would speak for itself, and generate demand all on its own, even 
raise the level of “taste” in the general consumer market, but in 
truth, the IncSoc Utility designs looked much the same as any 
other fashion of the age, and only an expert would notice the 
difference.98 Like many other wartime looks, the IncSoc Utility 
collection comprised mainly of straight, pleated skirts, military-
inspired jackets, padded shoulders, and boxy silhouettes. To be 
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fair, there was good reason the IncSoc designers chose to go this 
route. Square shoulders and boxy silhouettes were popular in 
wartime: they mirrored the uniforms of men and women in the 
service, and wearing such looks made British women feel more 
closely tied to the national war effort.99 Despite the clothing 
manufacturers’ cries that women still wanted variation, this 
fashion recipe left little room for it: uniformity was part of the 
point.100 By giving the public what it wanted, IncSoc ended up 
producing garments that blended right in – superior design or 
not.
 Though the Board of Trade was able to sell a “satisfactory” 
number of IncSoc Utility patterns to clothing manufacturers, 
they never asked the Society for another Utility commission, 
even though the scheme lasted for another ten years.101 The 
1942 IncSoc Utility commission failed to spark the “revolution” 
the fashion press heralded.102 Instead, members of the Society 
returned to focusing on designing for the haute couture market, 
or in the case of Hardy Amies and Victor Stiebel returned to 
their posts in the service.103 Molyneux’s solo work once again 
appeared as part of the London spring haute couture collection 
in 1943.104 Remaining members of the Society were approached 
around the same time to design clothing for an upcoming film.105 
Later, in 1946, while austerity restrictions were still in place, 
Digby Morton wrote a letter to the Board of Trade asking for 
exemption from the restrictions in designing clothes for a list of 
his clients who were going abroad, in order to present “first class 
propaganda for… London tailoring.”106 It seems that despite the 
designers’ willingness to participate in the challenge of designing 
fashionable, even glamorous clothes for the Utility scheme 
under austerity restrictions, even they eventually admitted the 
limitations of government conscripted fashion.
Conclusion: The Failure of Conscripted Fashion
 The story of the Utility clothing scheme is a story of 
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unprecedented intervention by the Board of Trade in the clothing 
industry. Though the primary focus of this intervention was 
economic - to ensure all sectors of British society, particularly the 
middle- and -working-classes, could afford good quality clothing 
in wartime – the Board of Trade also cared about fashion, and 
therefore attempted to make Utility clothing appealing in 
production and presentation to the consumers who would spend 
their precious coupons on it.
  From the start, however, Utility Scheme experienced 
problems that hindered the Board of Trade’s mission to make it 
fashionably appealing: from the unfortunate legacy of the First 
World War’s ‘standard’ scheme, the negative connotations of the 
word “Utility,” the poor quality of some of the scheme’s initial 
production runs, and the reluctance of the clothing industry itself. 
Although the Board of Trade attempted to mitigate the effects 
of these issues by commissioning the haute couture designers of 
IncSoc to create Utility garments, the problems inherent in that 
attempt led to a disappointing reception in the industry, press, 
and consumer market, further preventing the public from seeing 
Utility as anything other than a necessity. This truth became very 
clear after the war’s end, when the women who purchased Utility 
grew impatient with wartime restrictions on clothing and secretly 
wished for a change.107
 An answer to the women’s wishes arrived promptly 
in 1947, in the form of Christian Dior’s famous “New Look” 
collection. In stark contrast to the boxy silhouette, square padded 
shoulders, and straight skirts of wartime fashion, Dior’s collection 
featured an hourglass-shaped, “feminine” silhouette, softly 
rounded shoulders, and full skirts made from yards and yards of 
fabric – a feature that had been impossible during the wartime 
restrictions.108 In one of the most dramatic fashion turnarounds 
in the twentieth century (and perhaps of all time), women’s entire 
wartime wardrobes were rendered obsolete in a matter of a few 
months. Those that could afford to do so immediately filled their 
closets with ensembles conforming to the New Look, while those 
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that could not watched enviously.109
 Even at its height, the Utility scheme failed to generate 
the same level of excitement as Dior’s New Look collection. This 
failure was in part due to Utility’s nature as a form of government 
intervention into the clothing industry, which made it difficult 
for the public to see the program as anything else. Part of the 
blame, however, also rests with the Board of Trade’s handling of 
the scheme – how it produced and presented the project, and all 
the mistakes it made along the way. At its best, Utility clothing 
simply blended in with everything else. It was no better and no 
worse than other clothing on the market at the time, but even 
then, women still frowned at its name. Those who could not 
afford alternative clothing choices put up with it during the war 
out of necessity, but once given true choice, women were quick 
to abandon Utility.
 To this day, the Utility scheme occupies a unique 
place in collective memory: it never completely overcame the 
negative connotations inspired by its name: drab, heavy, boring, 
sackcloth, etc. or the negative effects of all the other problems it 
faced along its progression. Scholars of mid-twentieth century 
Model wearing Utility day dress 
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fashion history are faced with the task of explaining that this 
was not what Utility clothing actually looked like: “There was… 
no standardizing of dress,” writes fashion historian Geraldine 
Howell.110 “Far from being a story of drabness and misery, it is 
a story of color, inventiveness…”111 Julie Summers, historical 
consultant and author, explains. These experts and others have 
to counter the negative conclusion fashion enthusiasts jump to 
about wartime conscripted fashion.
 This unfavorable conclusion, however, is rarely based on 
empirical evidence or firsthand experience. Just as in the 1940s, 
modern-day fashion enthusiasts base their perception of Utility 
clothing first and foremost on the objectionablemental picture the 
term conjures up. This intriguing tendency reveals that fashion 
is more than just a progression of popular trends. It is also how 
those trends are produced and presented by all members of the 
fashion conversation, from the producers (designers and clothing 
manufacturers), to the presenters (retailers and the fashion press), 
to the wearers (the consumer public). In the case of Utility, poor 
production and presentation had a detrimental effect on the 
perception of the clothes themselves, to the extent that consumers 
no longer truly saw the garments for what they were. Ultimately, 
Utility’s fate is also its greatest contribution to fashion history: it 
offers a reflection on the progression of the fashion conversation 
itself, and just how removed this conversation can be from reality.
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